Það er betra að hafa augun opin

Það er betra að hafa augun opin.

 

Það er gott fyrir okkur að lesa okkur til um áætlanir stórþjóðana.

 

Kínverjar eru að taka sér stöðu á úthöfunum, og hafa áhuga á bækistöðvum fyrir her og flota,

á svipaðan máta og núverandi heimsveldi hafa haft, svo sem USA

 

Eg. 29.08.2013 jg

 

-------------------------

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Navy_installations

2.1 Bahrain

2.2 British Indian Ocean Territory

2.3 Egypt

2.4 Cuba

2.5 Djibouti

2.6 Greece

2.7 Hong Kong

2.8 Italy

2.9 Japan

2.10 Republic of Korea

2.11 Kuwait

2.12 Oman

2.13 Qatar

2.14 Saudi Arabia

2.15 Singapore

2.16 Spain

2.17 United Arab Emirates

 

---------------------------

 

Chinese Quest for a Naval Base in The Indian Ocean – Possible Options for China

 

http://www.maritimeindia.org/article/chinese-quest-naval-base-indian-ocean-%E2%80%93-possible-options-china

 

-------------------------------

 

Navy should shift warships to West Coast in response to China’s aggressive military buildup, defence analysts say

 

http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/08/11/navy-should-shift-warships-to-west-coast-in-response-to-chinas-aggressive-military-buildup-defence-analysts-say/

 

-------------------------------

 

RACE TO THE NORTH

 

Chinas Artic Strategy and its Implications

Shiloh Rainwater

 

http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/31708e41-a53c-45d3-a5e4-ccb5ad550815/

 

bls.  72

 

If the PRC has found little support for its Arctic Council bid in Norway,

Canada, and Russia, it has gained support from other Arctic players, particularly

Iceland. Since 2008, when Reykjavik’s economy collapsed, China has injected

substantial investment into the country, anticipating that it will soon become a

logistics hub as the Arctic warms. In April 2012 Premier Wen Jiabao traveled to

Iceland and signed a number of bilateral deals, including a framework accord

on North Pole cooperation. In response to these agreements, Iceland’s prime

minister, Johanna Sigurdardottir, has expressed her country’s support for China’s

accession to the council as a permanent observer.

 

 

Bls. 67

GRAN D STRA TEG Y AN D FOREIGN POLIC Y OBJEC TIVE S

Analysis of Chinese grand strategy literature offers key insights into China’s

foreign-policy goals and international behavior. During the 1990s, improvements

in China’s military capabilities led the United States to identify China as the

greatest modern threat to American primacy.35 In response, under Jiang Zemin’s

leadership, China began to focus on dispelling fears of the “China threat,” characterizing

its rise as peaceful and representing itself as “a responsible great power.”

Successive generations of Chinese leadership have pursued this strategy in differing

ways, as when China adopted the term “Peaceful Development” instead of

“Peaceful Rise” in 2004.36 The central logic of China’s grand strategy has remained

the same, however, since 1996, when Chinese leaders reached a consensus on a

foreign-policy line. According to one analyst, China’s grand strategy is designed

to “sustain the conditions necessary for continuing China’s program of economic

and military modernization as well as to minimize the risk that others, most

importantly the peerless United States, will view the ongoing increase in China’s

capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threat that must be parried or perhaps

even forestalled.”37 In short, China’s grand strategy aims to facilitate its rise to

great-power status without provoking a counterbalancing reaction.

Empirically, China’s grand strategy attends first to perceived threats

 

 

Bls.  68

42 In particular, China has not hesitated to employ naval force to

enforce its sweeping territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea,

claims that extend its borders more than a thousand miles from the mainland—

substantially farther than the two-hundred-nautical-mile limit of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS ).43 Examples include the

1974 battle of the Paracel Islands, the 1988 Johnson Reef skirmish, and the 2005

scuffle with Vietnamese fishing boats near Hainan Island, as well as a series of

recent clashes over sovereignty between units of the PLA N and vessels from Vietnam,

South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. According to PLA doctrine, “If ‘an

enemy offends our national interests it means that the enemy has already fired

the first shot,’ in which case the PLA ’s mission is ‘to do all we can to dominate the

enemy by striking first.’”44

--------------------------------

https://www.google.is/#q=China%E2%80%99s+Naval+Expansion+to+Iceland

1.   China trying to buy into Iceland - Politics - English - The Free ...

forum.thefreedictionary.com › EnglishPolitics

o    Cached

Apr 22, 2012 - 35 posts - ‎15 authors

REYKJAVIK: China's Premier Wen Jiabao landed in Iceland ... might be a cover for a possible future naval base and part of a wider strategy to gain .... benefit local residents when they expand their business in the third world?

 

2.   China and Iceland: Warming up to Iceland | The Economist

www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/04/china-and-iceland

o    Cached

Apr 17, 2013 - But for China, the ability to import more Icelandic fish with lower tariff duties ...... are concerned about Chinese expansion towards the Spratley islands, ... US Navy's presence in the Strait of Malacca was a worry leading China ...

 


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